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CHAPTER 6

COMPLIANCE WITH PRIVATE VOLUNTARY
AGREEMENTS: THE EXAMPLE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR
STANDARDIZATION'S ISO 14000
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT AND
RELATED STANDARDS

by Naomi Roht-Arriaza
Most thinking to date about compliance with international
agreements has been based on treaties created by states, which
impose obligations on state actors and set up various methods of
monitoring and enforcing compliance. 1 The agreements I want to
explore are fundamentally different in that (1) they are negotiated
within a forum where private actors are dominant, although states
participate; (2) the standards developed in this forum apply directly
to private organizations, without the required mediation of any state
agency; and (3) they rely on market mechanisms, at least in part, to
assure compliance. I will concentrate on agreements in the area of
environment, in particular on the Environmental Management
Systems (EMS) and related standards-ISO 14000 series-developed
by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO).2
ISO is a federation of over 100 national standardization bodies,
one from each represented country. It was formed in 1946 to
harmonize technical requirements and standards in industry. Each
national body establishes the composition of its delegations, which
should include a mix of producer, consumer and other relevant
interests; while it can, and often does, include government officials,

states have no pride of place. Recognized national bodies that wish
to become involved in a given standard-setting exercise do so by
sending delegations to international meetings where standards are
hammered out.'
Over forty countries are members of the technical committee,
known as TC 207, in charge of drafting the ISO 14000 standards.
The committee is composed, in turn, of sub-committees dealing with
environmental management, auditing, performance evaluation,
labeling, life-cycle assessment and terms and definitions.4 The
subcommittees are further divided into subgroups preparing a
discrete portion of the set of standards and guidelines. After the
subcommittees agree on a draft text, it is brought to the whole
committee for approval. Once TC 207 has approved a draft, it is then
sent out for balloting to the entire ISO membership. Two-thirds of
the member organizations must approve the draft, and no more than
a quarter of the votes may be negative votes rather than abstentions.
In the late 1980s, ISO pioneered a global standard for quality
control management, the ISO 9000 series. ISO 9000 set out
procedures and systems to ensure adequate feedback and control
systems for quality management, subject to periodic auditing as well
as verification by a private outside entity, who would then certify the
organization to the standard.5 This was one source of the model for
development of environmental management standards.
Other factors leading up to development of these standards were
the proliferation of eco-labeling programs in different countries as
well as of private corporate codes of conduct. In 1991, the Business
Council for Sustainable Development (BCSD) began creating
international standards that would allow businesses in various
sectors to measure their environmental impacts according to
comparable criteria.6 The BCSD's initiative dovetailed with that of
a coalition of socially responsible investors in the United States, who
in 1989 published the Valdez Principles, a set of voluntary
commitments intended to be used by investors to favor
environmentally responsible corporations.7 Corporations that signed
on to the principles were supposed to: minimize pollutants, resource
and energy use and waste generation; inform consumers of the
environmental impacts of their products and services, complete and
make public an annual self-audit of environmental progress and
work toward creation of independent environmental audit
procedures to be made available to the public; and establish
managemEnt and board structures to oversee environmental
performance. Other similar initiatives include the Business Charter
206

for Sustainable Development and the Global Environmental
Management Initiative (GEMI). To join, companies simply sign up;
public pressure is the only means of monitoring compliance with the
commitment. Sectoral codes of conduct, such as the Chemical
Manufacturers Association "Responsible Care" program, also
appeared.'
Most important, the European Community adopted a Regulation
setting up an Eco-Management and Auditing Scheme (EMAS). 9
Under EMAS, industrial sites establish systems to analyze the
effects of their activities on the environment, make public a certain
amount of information on those effects, and continuously improve
their performance in minimizing these effects, all verified by an
outside evaluator. Companies based outside Europe began worrying
that such a scheme might provide an unfair advantage to European
producers in European markets, and so pushed for a global standard
on environmental management and auditing.
The ISO 14001 environmental management system standard is
the centerpiece of the 14000 series. To comply, company
management must define the organization's environmental policy
and ensure that it is appropriate to the nature, scale and
environmental impacts of the organization's activities. Each
registered facility must commit to continual improvement, to
compliance with local laws, and to prevention of pollution (very
broadly defined). The environmental policy must be publicly
available, but assessments of environmental impacts need not be
published. Each organization must set up procedures to identify the
environmental effects of its activities, create and maintain
procedures to document these activities, identify individual
responsibilities, train appropriate personnel, and prepare an
emergency response plan. These activities must be periodically
monitored and corrective action taken in cases of noncompliance.
Environmental audits, whether internal or external, are required.
Such audits may be used by certification bodies to help verify
conformance with the EMS. There are no substantive
minimum/maximum amounts for pollutants, resource use, wastes or
the like; harmonization of such requirements was considered beyond
the scope of a systems approach.
The existence of an adequate system may be self-certified or a
firm may seek outside verification to certify that it conforms to the
standard. Certification allows the organization to publicize its
compliance to potential buyers. While the 14001 EMS is the only
standard to which an organization may be certified, the ISO 14000
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series also includes a "guidance document" providing more detailed
information on EMSs, and environmental auditing standards which
set out methodology for audits and qualifications for auditors. It will
also include labeling standards which cover goals and criteria for
environmental labeling, for specific methods and criteria for
manufacturers' self-declaration claims, e.g., product attributes like
recyclability, and for "seal of approval" programs like Green Seal or
Blue Angel.. Other related guidelines will deal with life-cycle
assessment and with environmental performance indicators-how to
measure improvements. The EMS standard and guidance document
and the auditing standards have recently reached the final drafting
stage, while the others will take another 1-4 years to complete.
In evaluating both potential compliance with the standards and
their effectiveness in improving corporate environmental
performance, one interesting question is the extent to which either
depends on the process by which the standard is created. A key
proposition of recent international law writing has been that legal
norms enjoy higher compliance rates if they are perceived as
legitimate."° One technique to boost legitimacy is to ensure that the
drafting forum adequately represents the interests of stakeholders.
The ISO's formal rules attempt to insure a balance among
producer, consumer (including environmental and other NGOs) and
government interests. In practice, the EMS drafting process was
dominated by large global corporations and by disputes between the
U.S. and European delegations. The formal equality of participants,
the lack of state predominance and the stated desire for balance
stand in contrast to the reality of domination by those interests with
the most money to attend the drafting meetings on a regular basis,
with the greatest economic stake in the outcome and with the
technical expertise to understand the arcane nature of some of the
discussions. Small and medium enterprises, NGOs, and developing
country delegations played marginal roles, at least until very late in
the drafting process. NGOs and some developing countries have
complained of a lack of access to documents or notice of meetings,
and NGOs especially have seen their role relegated to that of
"damage control." The private nature of the process has meant that
agendas, current drafts and topics under discussion have been
difficult for non-participants to obtain.
The contrast between formal openness and inclusiveness and
informal concentration of influence over the outcome raises a host of
research questions: is there some set of conditions under which
formal equality in a private negotiation will coincide with informal
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openness and ability for all major stakeholders to have input into the
final product? Or when corporations, NGOs and states come into a
negotiation as formal equals, will the actors with the most money
and most concentrated set of interests always dominate? And if not,
will the voluntary nature of the standards, and the fact that global
corporations will be their main "consumers" lead to the same result?
The answers have important implications for the design of
participatory negotiations, especially given persistent NGO calls for
more access and participation in international rule-making
processes.
Given the limitations of the drafting process, should we expect
compliance with the standards to be concentrated in the large global
corporations, based in developed countries, that were the prime
movers behind their adoption? On the one hand, it seems likely that
these will be the first firms to qualify for certification under ISO
14001, in large part because most of them already have management
and auditing systems in place. To date, most industry observers say
that these corporations will put in place the appropriate systems, but
will not necessarily spend money on formal certification unless
market forces or domestic regulators demand it. On the other hand,
the degree of enthusiasm and talk about the standards in large
developing countries like Korea and Brazil is inconsistent with the
hypothesis that representativity matters; while both delegations
have been playing a more active role recently, they only became
active after the basic architecture of the standards was in place.
Developing country enthusiasm is most likely explained because
the standards are weak enough substantively that they seem like a
relatively painless way for developing country industries to gain
acceptance into the club of "green" producers and head off the threat
of future trade restrictions. This is so in large part because the U.S.
delegation took the position that more stringent or substantive
standards would become trade barriers that would favor developed
over developing country industries. The U.S. delegation undoubtedly
had its own reasons of self-interest for propounding this argument,
but the result was that the U.S. in effect represented the interests of
the developing countries. This is a relatively rare outcome in
international negotiations, and bears closer scrutiny.
The goals and methods of enforcing compliance with private
voluntary standards differ substantially from those involved in
enforcing public agreements. The drafters of the ISO 14000 series
standards have carefully distinguished their goals from those of
typical government regulation. Rather than attempt to agree on
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substantive types or amounts of pollution, or resource use
reductions, or changes in industrial processes or inputs, the idea is
to adopt a management systems approach. This approach, as
discussed above, tries to get all relevant decision-making levels
within an organization to consider environmental aspects of their
decisions. No substantive goal is envisaged: the drafters are quite
clear that implementation of the standards will not necessarily
result in any real environmental improvement at all. The hope is
that by creating better and more widely distributed information
within the corporate structure, people will be moved to improve their
environmental performance. Moreover, this approach is seen as
appropriate precisely because it does not mimic, conflict nor compete
with the attempts of public regulatory agencies. And because it is
solely process-based, it avoids the kinds of fights over possible trade
barriers that would attend any attempt to design a uniform
substantive standard.
This approach was not uncontested during the drafting process.
European country delegations especially sought more performancebased provisions and better language regarding public access to
information, while the U.S. delegation was concerned with the
possible disadvantageous uses of information in domestic regulatory
and litigation arenas. In the end, the U.S. approach largely
prevailed. The victory of the "proceduralists" may be shortlived,
however, if opposition by governments and NGOs drains the effort
of its legitimacy and, therefore, of a major incentive for firms to sign
on.

Most developed country regulators are somewhat skeptical of the
lack of substantive standards and public access to information. The
European Commission has made clear it will require extra steps
beyond certification to allow implementation of ISO 14001 to serve
as partial compliance with EMAS requirements. 1 In the United
States, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has taken a
wait-and-see attitude, although some local administrators and state
officials are more enthusiastic. NGOs, while many only recently have
become aware of the implications of ISO 14000, are also cautious.
Several large Washington-based NGOs, e.g., the National Wildlife
Federation and the Environmental Defense Fund, and a few
international, e.g., the World Wildlife Fund and the Center for
International Environmental Law, have followed the negotiations for
some time, and one eco-labeling representative (Green Seal) has
headed a subcommittee. Most others have remained aloof, seeing
business domination of the forum and the talk of regulatory breaks
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as proof that the effort is mere "greenwash." If ISO-certified
companies begin publicly to tout their certification as a mark of
environmental superiority, or seek regulatory advantages on that
basis, NGOs will likely step up their opposition to the scheme. As a
voluntary scheme dependent in large part on public and regulatory
perceptions, concerted NGO opposition could be fatal.
Even if the scheme wins widespread acceptance, compliance is
not the same as effectiveness. Indeed, one of the major problems with
self-regulation is that a high degree of compliance is possible
precisely because standard setters demand little of themselves, and
the results are therefore ineffective. The current standards may be
quite effective in trade terms, defusing an otherwise difficult conflict
between trade and environment and facilitating global commerce.
They may, however, do little or nothing to improve environmental
outcomes. Moreover, because under ISO 14001 information need not
be made public, independent efforts to measure effectiveness in
terms of real improvements in environmental performance may be
difficult if not impossible. Nonetheless, a series of questions about
changes in operations, processes or training, combined with changes
in the environmental parameters required to be reported by existing
or new environmental laws, may give some indication of
effectiveness.
Under the ISO 14000 scheme, compliance is to be enforced
through audits and certification. While self-certification is a
possibility, it may not be credible, and many companies will turn to
third-party certification by registered certifiers. These will be
consultants with expertise in EMS, auditing and environment who
will assure that the management systems are in place and are
working as intended. Debates have focused on the nature and
qualifications of verifiers and auditors, including their geographic
distribution (local vs. European vs. U.S.) and their competence (big
auditing or quality control firms vs. environmental specialists). Plans
are underway to develop uniform guidelines for verifier selection,
training, and protocols. But for now, verifiers must only meet
national qualifications, and their methodology and training vary
significantly from country to country.
One of the weaknesses of ISO 14000 compared to other private
codes of conduct, or to the European EMAS regulation, is that it does
not require publication of information on emissions, resource use or
other environmental impacts. This reduces the possibilities of using
information as a spur to compliance. Through yearly reports on
emissions, waste, resource use and other parameters, it is possible

for interested parties to monitor whether adherence to the
code/standard has resulted in improvements or has been an empty
gesture. In this regard the information-based requirements of EMAS
and of some other codes of conduct parallel monitoring and reporting
requirements under public law. In the same way, monitoring and
reporting are aimed at (1) making sure relevant decision makers are
aware of environmental information (the EMS requires organizations
to ensure that top management has responsibility for decisions
affecting environmental performance) and (2) using the publication
of information as a way of shaming scofflaws and rewarding
compliance through NGO and community pressure. Only the first of
these goals will be satisfied under ISO 14001.
Whether through information provision or third-party
certification, the standard is designed to encourage adherence
through market mechanisms. Certification is not intended as a
consumer-oriented label. Indeed, environmentalists fear that it will
be misused as a marketing tool connoting a level of environmental
excellence that may be undeserved. It is, however, aimed at
purchasers of intermediate goods, public procurement agencies and
private companies seeking suppliers, who will require ISO
certification or at least evidence of compliance with the standards.
According to lawyers who represent transnational corporate clients,
this is already beginning to happen, and they expect that within a
short time adoption of the standards will be de facto mandatory for
doing business in one or more large global markets.
The nature of market-based compliance raises a series of
questions for future research. First, to what extent is public
information--actual figures on performance in addition to a general
policy statement-necessary to ensure that firms comply? And even
if such information may not be necessary to exert public pressure for
compliance, is it necessary to translate compliance into effective
environmental improvements? My hunch is that this is the case, but
case studies, would be useful. More generally, we understand little
about the interactions and synergies between public and private
forms of international and domestic agreements. In this case,
domestic regulatory climates combine with international trade
agreements and debates to create a private global agreement which
will then be enforced through domestic regulation and global market
mechanisms. The relative importance of the domestic regulatory
climate vis-h-vis other factors, for instance, remains unclear. It also
remains unclear if the efforts among transnational corporations to

harmonize their environmental practices worldwide would take place
even without regulatory requirements in a major market to do so.
Second, a number of issues revolve around the use of third-party
certifiers. Most certifiers, at least initially, will come from the ranks
of the large consulting/auditing firms that now certify companies to
the ISO 9000 series quality control standards. Indeed, proponents of
ISO 14000 argue that certification to both standards can be done
almost simultaneously, so it makes sense for firms seeking ISO 9000
certification to put both systems in place at the same time.
One advantage to market-based compliance may be that firms
seeking certification must expend the funds to pay for an adequatelytrained and accredited certifier of their environmental performance,
thus thrusting some of the costs of enforcement that would normally
be borne by the public onto the private sector. However, this will only
be beneficial if (1) certifiers have the proper training to look not only
at management systems but at highly technical environmental
process and waste issues, and (2) private certifiers are at least no
more subject to "capture" than their public counterparts would be, in
order to maintain the credibility on which their usefulness depends.
Neither of these two conditions are necessarily present. It would be
useful to look in detail at how certifiers are accredited, perceived in
various communities, how they perform their job, and how they see
their own role. The degree of oversight of certifiers by national
accreditation bodies also bears exploring; if it varies substantially
among states, some of the benefits of a single global standard may be
dissipated.
Third, it is not clear why purchasers, procurement agencies,
banks, insurers, or other actors in the market would require 14001
certification or compliance with the standard. The market-based
approach of ISO 14000 is modelled on the success of the ISO 9000
quality control standards. Starting from acceptance and integration
into procurement programs in Europe, the ISO 9000 standards are
now being eagerly sought by U.S. businesses and are required by
major purchasers, including the Defense Department and
automakers. However, purchasers and procurement people have
concrete and self-interested motivations for requiring quality control
certification-it reduces the risk of defective products. In the ISO
14000 case, there is no such immediate reason of self-interest to
require certification from suppliers. Nor are potential customers the
only constituency for an effective standard. Corporate environmental
behavior affects many outside the market chains, including local
communities and local and global ecosystems.
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At most, there may be self-interested pressures on banks and
insurers seeking to reduce their own potential exposure to
environmental liability if their clients have working EMSs in place.
But any pressure from purchasers and/or procurement agencies will
have to be based on a different set of concerns, which might include:
a desire to appear "green" or to break into new markets where
consumers value "green" goods; regulatory requirements that give
preference to environmentally superior products; adherence to
EMAS, which requires that certified companies prefer other
companies that comply with the standards; or lessened regulatory
scrutiny when purchasing from ISO-certified suppliers or having ISO
certification. Future research should focus on the extent to which
market forces push companies towards certification, whether there
are differences between large vs. small companies or their location
(North vs. South), and should compare the effectiveness of banks,
insurers, purchasers or procurers in convincing their
customers/suppliers/clients to adhere to the standards.
Similar issues apply to the companies themselves. Since ISO
14001 certification involves substantial costs to an enterprise,12 why
would a company choose to incur them? In a sense, this is analogous
to the question, in the public law context, of why states would sign
on to or comply with soft law. Several possible answers exist:
First, adherence to an EMS may result in cost savings, both in
terms of production efficiencies and avoided litigation or fines.' 3
Second, firms may wish to establish or hone their "green" image.
Third, they may already be seeking ISO 9000 certification and find
it advantageous to certify to ISO 14000 at the same time, without
much concern for the environmental implications.
Some firms may see adherence to the standard as a way of
preempting more stringent or intrusive forms of public regulation.
Industry has often turned to self-regulation as a perceived
alternative to "command-and-control" rules or as a way to reduce
public ove:rsight of their activities. Acceptance of the standards may
well be driven by either the perception or the reality of diminished
national regulatory oversight for companies which can show
compliance with the standards. In the United States, some of the
possibilities include fewer inspections, smaller non-compliance
penalties, leniency of sentencing in cases involving environmental
crimes, the ability to keep more internal records secret (under
"environmental audit" privilege laws) and even complete exemption
from some "command and control" regulation.1 4 These possibilities
constitute one of the major potential attractions of the standards
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from industry's standpoint, and fit nicely into an overall policy
climate where replacing command and control with voluntary
incentive programs is the order of the day.
Finally, firms may wish to avoid or preempt other international
or domestic requirements on environmental issues which might act
as trade barriers, keeping their goods out of lucrative markets with
stringent rules. As an international standard, ISO 14000 is entitled
to a presumption of legality under GATT/WTO rules; it may well be
seen as a way to provide an international framework for traderelated environmental measures which minimizes developing
countries' fears of "eco-imperialism," green protectionism and the
like. Indeed, one of the major discussions in the Asian context has
been the extent to which certification standards, and especially ecolabeling programs, constitute trade barriers. Developing countries
have been keen to assure that the emerging standards do not subtly
favor the goods of developed countries where most current ecolabeling programs exist. More positively, compliance may be seen as
a way to break into markets where consumers value environmental
probity.
Future research might focus on which motivations, or what
combination of motivations, are key, and if there are variations
among regions or among different size companies. Initial research
indicates, for example, that some large corporations selling directly
to the public and those based in areas with more ecologically-attuned
publics (Europe, for example) may be more motivated by the desire
to appear "green," while those in the United States seem to be driven
more by the preemptive and, to a lesser degree, cost-savings
justifications. For developing countries, the trade implications may
be paramount.
A final question concerns the evolution of private standards.
There are two possible outcomes: either the ISO 14000 standards
will deflect calls for greater international control over the
detrimental environmental impacts of global public and private
actors, or they will serve as a basis for more substantive standards.
Under the first scenario, global business will successfully argue that
a systems-based, voluntary approach is enough to ensure
improvement while not incurring any of the costs or unwieldiness of
an international regulatory system. Under the second,
implementation of the current-essentially procedural-systems
approach shows that a market-enforced, producer-focused approach
is viable and affordable, and pressure mounts to use it to impose
evermore substantive international guidelines. This would probably
215

take the form, first, of requirements to provide more information
and, eventually, of sectoral minimum/maximum emissions and
resource use "best practice" standards, beginning with those
industrial sectors with the greatest technological uniformity and
largest environmental impact. These precedents and proposals could
serve as building blocks for a substantive set of international
voluntary agreements.
Several precursors exist. The Netherlands has pioneered
negotiated covenants between government and industry, which can
either complement or take the place of mandatory legislation. Such
covenants may commit either an industry association or individual
industries and are enforceable through civil law. They have been
used to reduce the quantity of phosphates in surface water, to reduce
air emissions and to reduce discharges by the packaging, graphics,
metallurgy, dairy and chemical industries. 5 Denmark and the
Flemish region of Belgium have passed laws allowing for public
enforcement and sanctions of such negotiated agreements. The
European Commission is discussing region-wide negotiated
agreements on a company or sectoral level.'" In the United States,
several companies have entered into substantive "Good Neighbor
Agreements" wherein they agree to local community participation in,
and review of, environmental audits as well as substantive changes
in operations.17
These precedents may be translatable to the sphere of private,
voluntary agreements under pressure from NGOs and others. On the
other hand, the private, standard-setting model may not lend itself
to these kinds of substantive agreements, leaving it to states to
impose such agreements. It remains to be seen how much can be
accomplished by private actors and market forces. In either case, the
evolution, implementation and effectiveness of these private
voluntary agreements provides a rich research agenda for the next
few years.
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